THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

THE FARMER AND VICTORY

A Radio Discussion by * CHRIS CHRISTENSEN
T. W. SCHULTZ *and* WILLIAM SPENCER

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Around the Round Table . . . .

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T. W. SCHULTZ, professor and head of the department of economics at Iowa State College, received his B.S. degree from South Dakota State College and did his graduate work at the University of Wisconsin, where he received his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees. Professor Schultz has also taught at the University of Chicago and headed the Rural Social Science Section of the Iowa Agricultural Experimental Station. He is the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture of the Social Science Research Council and director of the study of personnel in rural social science of the American Council on Education. He is the author of numerous articles on economics, the editor of the *Journal of Farm Economics*, and the author of *The Tariffs on Barley, Oats and Corn* (1933); *Vanishing Farm Markets and Our World Trade* (1935); *Training and Recruiting of Personnel in the Rural Social Studies* (1941); and *Redirecting Farm Policy* (1943).

WILLIAM H. SPENCER, dean of the School of Business of the University of Chicago, is at present on leave from the University to act as director of the War Manpower Commission, Region 6. Dean Spencer did his undergraduate work at Birmingham College (Alabama) and received his Ph.D. degree and his law degree from the University of Chicago. As well as the University of Chicago, where he offers courses in business law, he has also taught at Birmingham College and Drake University. He has served as a director of the Institute of Meat Packing and, from 1934 to 1935, was chairman of the Chicago Regional Labor Office. He is the author of *A Textbook on Law and Business* (1929 and 1938); *Collective Bargaining under Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act* (1935); *The National Labor Relations Act* (1935); *The National Railroad Adjustment Board* (1938); and *Casebook of Law and Business* (1939).

THE FARMER AND VICTORY

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MR. SPENCER: How can the farmer best contribute to the winning of the war? Schultz, is agriculture really on a wartime basis?

MR. SCHULTZ: No, agriculture is not on a war footing.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't agree with you, Schultz. A large proportion of the American farmers are on a war basis.

MR. SCHULTZ: I would simply contend that we do not have agriculture on a war basis. We have a great deal of agriculture that's going on just as if there were no war on at all. I would say that also for the consumers, and I would say that for government that's serving agriculture.

MR. SPENCER: Schultz, do you remember that some eighteen months ago you and I had a ROUND TABLE here at the University with Secretary Wickard?

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. At that time, you will recall, I contended that our goals, which were the goals for 1942, were still on a peacetime basis, and the Secretary argued that they were on a war basis.[1]

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Let us look at those goals. For instance, in 1942, the total volume of all food in the United States was about 15 per cent over 1940. In Wisconsin, for instance, in the case of the dairy farmers, our milk production in 1942 was 22 per cent over the five-year average from 1935 to 1939.

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[1] See Claude R. Wickard, William H. Spencer, and T. W. Schultz, *Farmers and Defense*, a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE transcript, No. 184, broadcast September 21, 1941.

MR. SCHULTZ: We just throw those figures at ourselves all the time. There has been a very credible record, I grant, in some parts of agriculture, but look at the fact that virtually half of agriculture, in terms of people, is in the South, and cotton is not needed for the war.

MR. SPENCER: Certainly a factor that we can't ignore, gentlemen, is that for three years we've had excellent crop weather. We can't count on the continuation of the kind of crop weather that we've had.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: The weather situation has been one of the most favorable situations that the farmers have had.

MR. SPENCER: It's my impression that agriculture as a whole cannot be said to be a war industry.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I think that we must discuss this in the terms of the many, many parts or branches that we have in American agriculture. We can't generalize.

MR. SCHULTZ: I would make the rather sweeping statement that when one looks at the American consumers, he discovers that they are not on a war basis.

MR. SPENCER: I'd like to pose that as our first fundamental question: How far is consumption now on a wartime basis?

MR. SCHULTZ: It just is not. We're going ahead and consuming just as we would in a peacetime economy.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: You mean by that that the consumers generally do not recognize that food is an essential in this war economy.

MR. SCHULTZ: They may recognize it, but the housewife with her basket and much more income than before is just buying many more foods.

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FOOD PRICES*



* *United States News*, February 5, 1943.

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MR. SPENCER: Schultz, you've got to qualify that to the extent that, whereas that may be true in certain areas, it certainly isn't true in all areas.

MR. SCHULTZ: The only reason that it isn't is that they can't get the food. They certainly would take it if they could get it.

MR. SPENCER: But it must be recognized that the problem of food is a very uneven one throughout the United States.

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. Let me put it this way. The housewife of America has a tremendous role in this whole question of agriculture and the management of the food supply. She is a part of that story. My contention is that we're going on just as if there were peace as far as that side of the economy is concerned.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: We must recognize that the consumer has the problem that some of the highly nutritious foods—such as the dairy products and the meats and the eggs and the vegetables that she's been encouraged to buy for her family because they are desirable from the standpoint of the health and the efficiency of our people—require large quantities of labor.

MR. SCHULTZ: You've put your finger right on the crucial spot—the housewife must shift to foods that take less labor to produce. That's what hasn't happened yet.

MR. SPENCER: It's my impression that Great Britain is now pretty well on that basis. Its diet is largely a diet consisting of foods which do not require a high outlay of labor and yet a diet which does not impair the efficiency of the armed forces or of their war workers.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Except that it's true that in England, at the beginning of the war, they converted about four million acres of grassland to the production of grains, and that pattern is supplemented by the fact that we're sending under Lease Lend large quantities of highly nutritious meat products to the British people.


FOOD RATIONS FOR ONE MONTH FOR AN ARMY OF 7,500,000 MEN WOULD MAKE A PILE ABOUT AS LARGE AS THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
DAILY FOOD CONSUMPTION
SOLDIER
5¾ lbs.
CIVILIAN
4 lbs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE ACTOGRAPH -H.HAYDON-

MR. SCHULTZ: The first point is that the British have virtually as good a diet as we have from a nutritional point of view. Secondly, if we in the United States would move in the direction that they have, we would take a tremendous strain from our agriculture and would release agriculture's labor to a great extent.

MR. SPENCER: I'd like to have you give some specific illustrations of the type of foods that are included in that category.

MR. SCHULTZ: The English have turned away from these very expensive foods—expensive in terms of labor. They've gone from the animal products to cereals, to potatoes, and they have mixed proteins from the vegetable side, such as soya-bean flour, in with their meats. The result is that their food, on the vitamin side and calcium side, is just as good as ours. We, therefore, require much labor to take care of our needs in this country because we haven't shifted in that direction.

MR. SPENCER: It's my impression that, in order to achieve the shifts which are going on rather slowly at the present time, we're going to have to resort more and more to rationing of the types of foods to which you refer, in order that we can save labor.

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. We must do it by rationing. That's the only way I see by which we can do it.

MR. SPENCER: Certainly one of the reasons that we want to resort to rationing is to save manpower.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Speaking of rationing, up to this moment in the minds of the public isn't the major emphasis on rationing that it is necessary so that we may set aside certain allotments of these foods for the armed forces, for Lease Lend, and for the occupied areas?

MR. SCHULTZ: That's where the emphasis has been, but it seems to me that we must emphasize, as we're doing here this afternoon, that it is through rationing that the consumer can help in the agricultural manpower problem. That is, he can help take the strain off from agriculture. Further, rationing is the only basis by which we can share our foods.

MR. SPENCER: I want to emphasize the point that rationing is not merely a device for getting more food for the Allies,[2] that it's not merely a device for seeing that everybody gets his full share of available foods, but that it is also a device by which we economically produce and use the foods that we have.

MR. SCHULTZ: That's right. We've got to now, it seems to me, face up to the obstacles that stand in the way of rationing.

MR. SPENCER: One of the outstanding obstacles, of course, has been a public attitude—a certain business-as-usual.

MR. SCHULTZ: Or consumption-as-usual. Consumption-as-usual is what's going on in the United States today.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Has the public been fully informed as to the facts regarding this food situation?

MR. SCHULTZ: No, I don't think that it has.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: For several years the public has been told that we had too much food in certain areas.

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[2] According to the Lend Lease Administration, lend lease exports of food in relation to supply are: 6.6 per cent of the meat; 3.4 per cent of the milk; 0.7 per cent of the butter; 10.9 per cent of the eggs; and 2.5 per cent of the canned fruits and vegetables.

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. We had surpluses a year ago, two years ago, and in many quarters we still think that there are large surpluses.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: How could we expect a large part of the public to turn about in their thinking with respect to this food problem?

MR. SPENCER: One of the difficulties in that respect is that we do have surpluses of certain types of foods, and the consuming public thinks that we have surpluses of all types of food.

MR. SCHULTZ: There's another broader, deeper point here. I think that we're all more or less of the opinion that we're going to have a quick victory. We're got this complex, and, therefore, we reason, "Well, we don't have to ration. It's only nine months, twelve months, and this whole thing will be over."

MR. SPENCER: Certainly as the public gets a keener sense of urgency about these things, I'm convinced that it will accept rationing as a way of utilizing manpower.

MR. SCHULTZ: I certainly hope so. We must. The second point is that the government is exceedingly slow in moving on rationing.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Hasn't that really had a tendency to convey to the public that, after all, this food situation is not critical, because announcements are made, and oftentimes several weeks elapse before the management and the procedure are really put into effect?

MR. SPENCER: Of course, there is a real mechanical problem there—the problem of printing all the rationing books is no small one. How many million had to be printed?

MR. SCHULTZ: I suppose that there are about forty million families. It takes trainloads of rationing books. That is a big job, no doubt.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm convinced that we could get more voluntary cooperation from the public and that it need not all be done by a strict rationing program.

MR. SCHULTZ: I think that you're wrong on that, Christensen. This whole notion, that some people are playing up, that we can do this on a voluntary basis puts the housewife who actually acts on that on the spot, in the sense that her neighbors do not perform. I do not think we should rely on that. We should get right down and decide who is going to get the food and in what amounts.

MR. SPENCER: That voluntary cooperation, Christensen, places a very high premium on the hoarder, and I think that, in order to eliminate the hoarder, we've got to ration.

MR. SCHULTZ: One other aspect in the problem is that we certainly ought to insist that the government clean its own house and get rid of the conflicts that exist among and within agencies now in Washington on rationing. The Office of Price Administration and the Department of Agriculture, for instance, are still at conflicting points on this whole matter of rationing.

MR. SPENCER: I would agree, but I'd like to add one thing. The public is ready for rationing whenever the government comes out with a good program and with sufficient facts to indicate the necessity for it not only as a way of seeing that people get a proper division of foods but also as a way of saving manpower and taking the strain off agriculture.

MR. SCHULTZ: If the housewife who goes to the grocery store to buy food could see that by a certain reshuffling of our diets we could still have good nutrition, we would save manpower in agriculture and we would take the strain off agriculture. Everyone would get his share of food, and I think that we'd be ready to move.

MR. SPENCER: I want to pose a second major question: How far is agriculture, from the point of view of production, now on a war basis?

MR. SCHULTZ: I contended at the beginning that it is not. It simply, in my opinion, is not on a war economy. It's going ahead as usual. I throw at you again this point of the South. Here also is

the wheat economy. We have one billion, six hundred million bushels of wheat in this country, nine hundred million in Canada, and we go on as if that isn't an asset at all.

MR. SPENCER: We're going to need that wheat after the war is over, and we certainly need some surplus now.

MR. SCHULTZ: All right, but we need only about five hundred million bushels as a maximum in reserve for when the war ends. That leaves a tremendous amount. All the old schoolhouses, all the churches, all the elevators—everything is full; and yet we do not convert it into chickens, into milk, or into hogs, as we should be doing.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: The present wheat loans and benefit payments have been encouraging the production of more wheat. Why not discontinue that encouragement to the wheat grower?

MR. SCHULTZ: Let's just look at farm prices, because that's the point that you really have raised there. The loans are part of the price structure, and I think that we've just got to recognize that farm prices are in a bad tangle. They are in a snarl. There are some farm prices that are too high and some farm prices that are too low to do this production job.

MR. SPENCER: In other words, we're not giving sufficient incentive at the present time to produce the highly nutritious foods, such as meats and dairy products and peanuts and potatoes . . . .

MR. SCHULTZ: . . . . and dried beans and dried peas—those are some in that group.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Can we agree, then, that there should be more in the way of a price incentive to farmers who are producing these highly nutritious meat products and possibly some revision in the price structure in the case of cotton and wheat?

MR. SCHULTZ: We just have to face the fact that we've got a price policy tied to what is called "parity," which is 1910–14 pur-

PARITY PRICES*



chasing power carried up. Now, that's three decades ago. It fitted 1910–14, but those prices do not fit our war needs.[3]

MR. SPENCER: I'd like to follow up Christensen's point there for a moment. If we remove the incentives now for the production of such crops as cotton and if we add to or allow the prices of these highly nutritious foods to go up, don't we involve ourselves in inflation?

MR. SCHULTZ: I wish that you had raised two points—inflation *and* the high cost of living. I think that the more serious point right now is that the high-cost-of-living argument may cause labor to want to get its wages up and that that gives you inflation.

MR. SPENCER: I was coming to that point, because, right now, throughout the nation we know that labor is beginning to ask for a revision of wages upward because costs of living have gone up.

MR. SCHULTZ: If we could get away from parity and if we could get some of these farm prices down—rye, sorghum, corn, barley, cotton especially, wheat—and if then we could get other prices up, the general price, or the center of gravity of all farm prices, wouldn't change very much. Actually, I think they'd just about cancel out.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: In a war economy it isn't a matter of parity; it's a matter of getting the production of the particular food items that you want.

MR. SCHULTZ: That's exactly the point.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: We've got to recognize that price incentive is the most powerful and effective factor in getting more output.

MR. SCHULTZ: Here we are, tied to parity that's three decades obsolete. It's simply a strait jacket which is giving us this price snarl.[4]

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[3] "Farm parity" has been defined by law as that price which will give each commodity the same purchasing power in terms of prices, taxes, and interest paid by farmers in the base period.

[4] See Paul Appleby, Edward Duddy, and T. W. Schultz, *Farm Parity*, a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE transcript, No. 236, broadcast September 20, 1942.

Mr. Spencer: Again I want to come back and make it perfectly clear that by taking away some of the incentives which we are now holding out for the production of certain crops, such as cotton, let us say, would we thereby offset, in any degree, the price increases that would be involved in getting higher production in highly nutritious foods?

Mr. Schultz: You would in the case of wheat. You would in the case of several of the products that I mentioned. Let's take cotton for just a second in that connection. Here we have an economy which involves almost half of the farm people of the United States. We've got so large a stock of cotton carry-over that if we didn't produce any short-staple cotton next year we'd still have plenty. You could take all the 1943 crop and dump it in the Gulf of Mexico, and you wouldn't hurt the war effort one iota. Furthermore, we're going to use a lot of ships to bring in fertilizer from Chile to grow more cotton. That simply doesn't make sense.

Mr. Christensen: Yet, Schultz, there is also involved in your discussion of this cotton picture in relation to the war economy a certain reform program that may have merit in peacetime.

Mr. Schultz: No. It's a matter of getting the cotton resources producing things we need for war. I don't care a heck about reform at this point.

Mr. Spencer: I would agree with Schultz in that respect. We're not interested in a new alignment of agriculture—whatever may be its benefits after the war. The primary thing now is to raise the kinds of foods in sufficient quantities to meet our needs and, secondly, to do that, from the point of view of labor, in the most economical way possible.

Mr. Schultz: Most of this problem is political. We're in a sort of a jam on that point. I sometimes think that if we could get the Republicans in the South to tackle this, and the Democrats in the North, we might get this price thing unsnarled.

Mr. Spencer: Are you suggesting that the Republicans in the South elect Republican senators and that we in the North elect Democratic senators?

Mr. Christensen: That would be a revolution.

Mr. Schultz: We'd get a new point of view in the farm bloc, I'm quite sure, on this particular price issue that we're talking about.

We're talking here about the production side and how we can get more production, and we've talked of the price at the moment. I'd make another point. In this area, where we're producing animal products that we need, the small farmer, or put it this way—about 40 per cent or more of the farmers are still underemployed. That is, they are not contributing as much as they could if they were helped in this production of food.

Mr. Spencer: As I understand it, there are about three million of those, are there not?

Mr. Schultz: Well, in this section it wouldn't be quite that number, but it gets almost to that point. . . . .

Mr. Spencer: A rough approximation. . . . .

Mr. Schultz: That's right. It seems to me that that is an important shift that has to be made.

Mr. Spencer: You've got to add to that the fact that for the most part they are on a subsistence basis and are not really producing a surplus.

Mr. Schultz: No, no. Take Iowa, the state that I know very intimately. Every farmer produces a great deal for market, but it's the man who produces sixty hogs who, if he had the feed and had the credit to get the feed, could just as well produce one hundred and eighty hogs.

Mr. Christensen: I don't agree with you. I would agree that some of those farmers could expand their hog production from sixty to a hundred, but I would question whether or not all those farmers



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have the managerial talent and ability to really step up the production as you've indicated.

MR. SCHULTZ: I think that we just make too much of that point. There are whole counties—and certainly the great bulk of places—where managerial skill is excellent. I would contend that many of them can double their production next year if we would simply get to work now and bring the feed to them and give them the other necessary equipment that's needed at this point.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'd like to put it this way: I think that we need the maximum output on those farms but that we also need the maximum output on the more efficient farms.

MR. SPENCER: The large farm units in the Middle West are producing almost as much as they can at the present time. Where we can get additional production is in the marginal areas and dairies.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Some of those larger farm units in the Middle West (and I'm speaking now of the family-size farms) are up against the manpower problem, because in many cases the experienced, skilled farmhand son or son-in-law or hired man, who has been on that farm for several years, has gone into the armed forces.

MR. SCHULTZ: I think that we've just got to take up for a moment here the manpower problem.

But I still want to contend that the prices are very important—the way they're handled—and that we've got a large number of farmers, honest-to-goodness farmers, who can produce these foodstuffs but who are now underemployed.

There are a fifth of the farmers, roughly, who are these men that you described, who are getting tight on labor where the manpower problem does arise, and it's very serious.

MR. SPENCER: Is the manpower problem the only thing that stands in the way of the greater utilization of the type of farmers to which you refer?

MR. SCHULTZ: It is the limiting factor from now on out in this one-fifth section in the animal products.

MR. SPENCER: The third question that we have to turn our attention to is the manpower problem as far as agriculture is concerned.

MR. SCHULTZ: On the production side?

MR. SPENCER: Yes, we're still talking about the production side. What about the manpower problem primarily from the point of view of agricultural production?

MR. SCHULTZ: One can't get perspective on this issue unless he takes into account the fact that we've got three giant categories in which our manpower must be seen. We have the armed forces; we have industry; and we have agriculture.

MR. SPENCER: I'd like to add to that that we have to save a few people to produce some things for the civilians.

MR. SCHULTZ: All right. But it seems to me that we have to ask ourselves how large an army we need. We may have too large an army.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Very definitely, and if we're really going to

COST OF LIVING*

Cost of Goods Purchased by Wage-earners and Lower-salaried Workers in Large Cities, November, 1942



Cost of Commodities Used by Farmers for Family Maintenance, September, 1942



*Office of War Information release, from Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

consider food as an essential, along with armaments and men, I think that we have to have some sort of a reappraisal of the size of our armed forces.

MR. SCHULTZ: There certainly is a problem there. In industry today I certainly would contend that we're hoarding a lot of labor.

MR. SPENCER: I think that that's true, and, of course, the War Manpower Commission is doing everything it can with its present powers to compel industry to utilize its workers to the fullest degree possible.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, and in some of these industrial plants—where labor is being hoarded—there is experienced manpower that could be well utilized on some of these farms.

MR. SPENCER: That's true, and that's a matter of policy and a matter of allocation of manpower which has to be handled through the national War Manpower Commission.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: But, in discussing this manpower problem in agriculture, I think that it's very important that we again be rather specific. For instance, in the crop branches of agriculture and farming there is a situation, in the case of wheat and vegetables and some of those crops, where your labor problem is essentially seasonal.

MR. SCHULTZ: That's right.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: There is also a type of agriculture that's highly mechanized, and here I think that there's an opportunity to meet some of their labor problems with the land army in making available seasonal help. On the other hand, in the animal industries of agriculture—livestock, dairy farms, poultry—the problem is totally different.

MR. SPENCER: Before you go on, I wish you would explain what you mean by a "land army." Do you mean to say that you're going to bring people in through Selective Service and assign them to an army that will work on the farms?

Mr. Schultz: I have a suspicion that Christensen thinks that a city person can easily help shock wheat and take care of these seasonal crops, but he's very apprehensive if you use them in all-year-round jobs, that is, for example, milking cows. I would say in either case that the skills don't come that quickly and that I have my misgivings about this land-army thing that the press is talking so much about now.

Mr. Spencer: I'd like to have Christensen tell us what his land-army concept is.

Mr. Christensen: My concept of the land army is the recruiting of people from the city population, many of whom, in fact most of whom, have no background or experience with respect to farming.

Mr. Schultz: Before we go too far in detail, it seems to me that we must point out the two big dangers ahead of us here. We have the one danger that agriculture is going to contend that it has to keep everybody that's in agriculture now in that industry. I think that that simply doesn't stand. We have too many people in much of agriculture, and they ought to be drained out.

The other danger is that we're going to have blanket treatment of agriculture in the sense that we'll drain people out of all sections and do a great deal of harm to the very sections that are getting tight.

Mr. Spencer: I want to reaffirm that by saying that industry at the outset said, "Why, here, we must keep these people." Now, we're not allowing industry to keep people except in terms of the possibility of replacement. I think that agriculture has to face the same problem. We cannot give them blanket deferments.

Mr. Christensen: I'd like to emphasize that in the manpower problem of agriculture the most critical spot is the need of year-round men who are already trained and experienced and skilled in farming.

SOMEONE SHOULD MAKE UP HIS MIND

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MR. SCHULTZ: If you say that, we have to admit at the same time that there are wide areas in other sections of agriculture from which a large number of people could be drained. I would say that in 1943 we might have a million and a half people move out of agriculture and, as a matter of fact, do no harm. It actually would contribute because of their contribution to other parts of the economy.

MR. SPENCER: That is, they would go into the armed forces or into the war industries.

MR. SCHULTZ: That's right.

MR. SPENCER: That would be on the assumption, however, and it would have to be on that assumption, that the regions which were thus exploited would fully utilize the labor which it had left.

MR. SCHULTZ: The other side that you've mentioned there, Christensen, is like the so-called "milk shed" around each of the large cities. There, the farm labor situation is getting very, very critical.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Very critical.

MR. SPENCER: It seems to me that one thing that the farmers have to realize is that, if they want to compete with the war industries in the matter of getting recruits and workers, they will have to pay higher wages and provide better living conditions.

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes, indeed. The way to get labor used more economically in agriculture, it seems to me, is to get its wages up. That will help the whole economy.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Many farmers are paying high wages already. Up in Wisconsin we have farmers that are paying eighty, ninety, and a hundred dollars a month.

MR. SCHULTZ: You have those exceptional cases. The average is getting that high in Wisconsin—it isn't exceptional—but we have to face the fact that wages in agriculture as a whole are very, very low compared to the rest of the economy.

MR. SPENCER: The living conditions, the community services, and the recreational opportunities are also limited in the agricultural areas.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: The problem on the dairy farms is that they have to have more of a price incentive to meet the higher wage structure.

MR. SPENCER: Gentlemen, we are agreed that the consumer has a heavy responsibility in helping the farmer do his job of producing

more food as a war weapon. Certainly agriculture as a whole, notably the Cotton Belt, is not now on a wartime basis.

We are agreed that we must produce more fighting foods, such as meat, dairy products, eggs, peas, peanuts, and soya beans.

We are agreed that in some regions and in some agricultural activities farm workers are not now being fully utilized.

We're not agreed fully as to how far the increased prices for farmers will solve this problem. We do believe that removing some of the loans on cotton production, and perhaps even in wheat, may help out, but we still will have left, after that is done, a problem of recruiting and allocating and training farmers with farm experience in order to get the food that we need.

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More on This Topic

"Nutrition and Food Supply: The War and After," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1943. *Over fifty articles on food supplies, nutrition, distribution, and food production.*

REID, MARGARET G., *Food Strategy.* "Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series," No. 1. Ames: Iowa State College Press, January, 1943. *An analysis of international food needs.*

SCHICKELE, R., *Manpower Program for Agriculture.* "Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series," No. 3. Ames: Iowa State College Press, February, 1943.

SCHULTZ, T. W., *Farm Prices for Food Production.* "Wartime Farm and Food Policy Series," No. 2. Ames: Iowa State College Press, February, 1943. *Argues that needed foods are priced too low, while some farm products with a low wartime rating are priced too high.*

———, *Redirecting Farm Policy.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1943. *States the reasons why the government should adopt a new farm policy and indicates what these farm goals should be.*

STANIFORD, JAMES, "Must America Go Hungry?" *American Mercury*, January, 1943. *An analysis of American food supply.*

STRAIGHT, MICHAEL, "The Fight for Food," *New Republic*, February 1, 1943. *Argues that agriculture is a year behind industry in expansion and conversion.*

SUMNERS, HATTON W., "Prospective Agricultural Production," *Vital Speeches*, January 15, 1943. *A statement of why the farmer is skeptical of government farm policy.*

WALDRON, WEBB, "Wake Up to the Farmer's Plight!" *Reader's Digest*, January, 1943. *A plea for protection of the farm labor supply.*

What Do *You* Think?

1. Do you think agriculture is a war industry? Would you say that agriculture is on a war basis? What is the responsibility and role of the consumer? Discuss.

2. Should Americans shift their diet to foods that have a lower labor cost? What kind of food would you have to eat if this were done? Would such a diet be adequate? Will rationing help make this shift?

3. What is the manpower situation in agriculture? Do you think that Mr. Schultz is correct in saying that "in 1943 we might have a million and a half people move out of agriculture and actually do no harm"? What Selective Service policy should be adopted for agriculture?

4. In your opinion is another cotton crop needed? Should the government subsidy for cotton farmers be abandoned? What foods might be produced in the South instead of cotton? What are the political forces that protect the cotton economy?

5. What should farm prices accomplish? Will present farm prices do the job of getting the right foods produced? What is "parity"? Do you agree with Mr. Schultz that parity is obsolete? Discuss. What is the relation of the high cost of living and inflation to farm prices?

6. Should the wheat and oat surpluses of Canada be allowed to enter the United States, or should the tariff keep this food out? What is the relation between Lend Lease requirements and total United States food supply?

The People Say . . . .

The following letters are representative of the views expressed by the ROUND TABLE *audience on "American Foreign Policy," broadcast January 31, 1943.*

*

What Are We Fighting For?

Since we are invading Axis-controlled countries, naturally we will find the governments in the hands of Nazi picked men including all machinery of government and their armies. If we intend to permit them to remain in power for *any kind of* expediency, then what are we fighting for?

When we negotiate peace terms with the "little Hitlers" in occupied territories as we have in Africa, will we not in *effect* have negotiated a peace with Hitler regardless to whom we turn over the government of Germany? . . . . Did not our State Department's policy in effect support Franco and help materially to destroy the Republic of Spain? Will not its present policy in a similar way aid in the destruction of the French Republic? . . . .—*A listener from Cedar Rapids, Iowa*

*

One Principle

. . . . To the one principle involved General Eisenhower was true. The same principle is involved all along the line. It applies in dealings with Germany and Italy and Japan, not less strictly than in North Africa or anywhere else in the world. We have no quarrel with the German people because they like Hitler, nor with the Italian people because they like Mussolini, and want them to manage their political affairs. Our only quarrel with them is that they do not keep their idols at home. They are ravaging vast areas over which the German and Italian peoples have no rights, and they threaten to ravage all the rest of the world. That is the basis of our participation in this war. In our course we are proceeding on sound principle, principle which does not need to be warped and twisted this way and that to suit the fortuities of circumstance. . . . . We are out to suppress aggression, and when we presume farther we are sacrificing the only principle which can justify our course in the war. . . . .—*A listener from New Jersey*

*

Look Ahead

. . . . The winning of the war is now the chief aim, but men are thinking now as never before. Your ROUND TABLE is one factor in this. And what of the effect of Peyrouton on the American public? Well, I'm one of them, and so far as I'm concerned I am more confused at the policy of our State Department than I was before. Have

they any policy? If so, I can't sort it out. Are we in for a whole series of expediencies? If so, why talk of democratic principles to the rest of the world? Are not democratic principles closely allied with moral principles? Can the two be separated and justified or reconciled? I have just been reading *Peace and War, 1931–1941*, and the thought came to my mind: Why don't you look where you are going—or go where you are looking. . . . . We cannot have any long-range objective so long as we cannot see where we are heading; so long as the State Department remains confused, so long will the people also. At present, as I see it, we are fighting the war to effect a cessation of hostilities—but for what kind of a peace? Who knows?—*A listener from Oak Lane, Pennsylvania*

*

Isolationism—Hub of Problem.

. . . . It struck me that the hub of the whole thing was this—our isolationist policy. This has been followed by necessity since our repudiation of any active part in the League of Nations. . . . . Our foreign policy under Hull has been commendable in that it has had a sympathetic tendency toward some aims of Woodrow Wilson, but has been greatly retarded by the policy of the period of 1920–1933. The New Deal did not have a popular mandate for a reversal of this policy. Hence, we could not aggressively take our proper place in international affairs that the urgency of the crisis preceding this war should have required. . . . . From this, I would say that our long-range policy of isolationism has caused expediency to be a leading factor. We will have to change this isolationist viewpoint if we want a different long-range policy. . . . .—*A listener from Bowling Green, Missouri*

*

Will Betray Us

. . . . Where immediate military expediency requires us to use men having backgrounds of various hues of fascism and in so doing to place them in key positions of power, how far can we trust these Quislings not to sabotage our cause or even stab us in the back if and when opportunity offers? . . . . In my view, the danger of our betrayal by the type of man we are back of seems to me an even more important reason for doubting the soundness of our policy than the long-range danger of undermining the confidence of our Allies in our objectives.—*A listener from South Bend, Indiana*

*

Fight for Democracy

. . . . Now, we believe that the majority of Frenchmen are not Vichy-minded. True, the Vichy opportunists were in power for a short while—but it was not of the free choice of the French people—but our military forces should *not* HAVE cooperated with opportunists just because of a supposed expediency. To save lives? But then we should stay at home altogether, for war is a risk and lives are being lost. If we fight for democracy and decency, let us admit we made a mistake in North Africa. . . . .—*A listener from Los Angeles, California*

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245. *The Challenge to Local Government*
246. *After One Year of War—What Have We Learned?*
247. *Italy*
248. *Social Security: Challenge to Democracy*
249. *Woodrow Wilson: Prophet or Visionary*
250. *Things To Come: How Science May Shape the Next Twenty-five Years*
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254. *American Foreign Policy: Principle versus Expediency.* January 31

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Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLU	1450
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11:00 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

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Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
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DANIEL PRESCOTT, Department of Education, University of Chicago

(THIRD SPEAKER TO BE ANNOUNCED)

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SUGGESTED READINGS

DEAN, VERA MICHELES, "Germany in Post-war Reconstruction," *Yale Review*, autumn, 1942.

MEIKLEJOHN, ALEXANDER, "Education as a Factor in Post-war Reconstruction," *Free World*, January, 1943.

SOFFNER, HEINZ, "Can Europe's Youth Be Salvaged?" *Survey Graphic*, January, 1943.

WALLACE, HENRY A., "Post-war Policy," *Vital Speeches*, January 1, 1943.

ZIEMER, GREGOR, "Education for Death," *Reader's Digest*, February, 1943.

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